As China’s legislature opened to elect a new government, it’s time to curb the ultra-leftist revival which threatens Xi Jinping’s plan to revive the economy and goal of national rejuvenation
My latest op-ed published on today's South China Morning Post.
Since its inception in 1921, China’s Communist Party has lurched between ultra-left radicalism and pragmatism, bringing about alternating tragedies and triumphs.
In the first 30 years of the People’s Republic, Mao Zedong’s erroneous emphasis on ideology and class struggle, fanned by ultra-leftist nationalism, produced catastrophic consequences.
In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping ended the disastrous Cultural Revolution and adopted an open-door policy, which put China on the track of reform and opening up, and which paved the way for its economic lift-off.
Mindful of the devastating results of policies such as the Great Leap Forward and Anti-Rightist Campaign, Deng repeatedly warned that the party should primarily guard against ultra-leftist tendencies, even as it should be vigilant against turning to the right. Wary of the constant debate of socialism vs capitalism over the use of foreign technology and the development of the private economy, he came up with the phrase bu zheng lun (let’s dispense with theoretical debate), to focus the party’s attention on growing the economy.
Deng’s successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have followed his doctrine by expanding the role of market forces while keeping a low profile for China on the international stage.
Jiang came up with his own phrase to summarise his style of governance, men sheng fa da cai (keeping quiet will help you make a fortune), while Hu’s is shorter – bu zhe teng (this has many meanings but usually, don’t flip-flop or don’t dither).
Their pragmatism has ensured China’s rise to become the world’s second-largest economy in merely 30 years.
Over the past decade, however, ultra-leftist national sentiment has made a comeback with a vengeance, threatening to derail China’s economic development.
Since coming to power in late 2012, Xi Jinping has consolidated power in his hands and strengthened the party’s control over all levels of society with the sharp claim that “east, west, south, north and centre, the party leads everything”.
Abroad, the party jettisoned Deng’s dictum of “hiding one’s strength and biding one’s time”, openly clashing with the United States and its Western allies across ideological lines and over values.
But China is at a crossroads. The government faces an uphill battle to revive an economy battered after three years of zero-Covid policies, with rising unemployment and falling consumer confidence. China’s open confrontation with the West has soured foreign investor sentiment and its ill-timed campaign to curb excesses in the private sector has backfired big time.
To make it worse, ultra-leftists have taken advantage of China’s confrontation with the US and the crackdown on the private sector to push their agenda under the guise of patriotism and allegiance to Communist ideals. Their influence has now largely moulded China’s domestic policies and stance on external relations.
To put it bluntly, if the ultra-leftist sentiment remains unchecked, China’s development risks being derailed, and China’s goal of national rejuvenation – Xi’s ambition to turn the country into a dominant world power by the middle of the century – will remain just a dream.
The opportunity has come for China’s top leaders to take serious steps to curb the ultra-nationalistic tendencies and get back on the track of reform and development.
On March 5, China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, opens its annual session and the top agenda item is to elect a new government, including the president, premier and other top officials. It will largely be a ceremonial affair because the leadership changes at the party’s 20th Congress last October have already determined the key positions.
Xi is set to secure the presidency for another five years while his closest ally, Li Qiang, will become premier, with the rest of the new cabinet full of Xi’s supporters.
The importance of this new cabinet should not be underestimated. The party might use the formation of the new government to signal a conciliatory approach at home and abroad, as it needs a more stable domestic and international environment to focus on reviving the economy.
At home, Li is expected to unveil pro-market measures in the coming months to boost the confidence of investors and consumers.
Abroad, China is expected to soften its hawkish stance towards the West. China has released a position paper calling for a political settlement of the Ukraine crisis on the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion. Amid international concerns about Beijing’s growing ties with Moscow, China is presenting itself as a peace broker.
French President Emmanuel Macron is expected to visit China early next month while Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the European Union, has frequently met EU officials to explore the possibility of reviving the EU-China investment treaty, which was frozen because of the tit-for-tat sanctions over Xinjiang.
China and the US may have exchanged angry words over the “spy” balloon incident but there are suggestions that both Washington and Beijing want the incident to blow over, no pun intended.
But signalling a conciliatory approach is not enough. China’s leaders face growing scepticism at home and abroad after their policy blunders and three years of zero-Covid, during which confidence in the rule of law was seriously compromised as officials locked people inside their homes or sent mildly infected people to quarantine centres for weeks in the name of pandemic control.
Recently, it took the authorities at least 10 days to confirm that missing billionaire fund manager Bao Fan had been detained to help with an investigation.
Underneath all those wanton acts and disregard for the rule of law are ultra-leftist tendencies running amok.
It is high time to revisit Deng’s warning and return to the practices of bu zheng lun and bu zhe teng.
End
Thanks for the article. In general, avoiding "ultra leftist" taking over is certainly a good idea. "Ultra" anything is usually bad.
I would disagree with one of your points that "ill-timed campaign to curb excesses in the private sector has backfired big time". Curbing excesses in the private sector is never "well-timed". Pricking a bubble always causes pain, especially for the careless participants who over-expanded. The private sector is continuously trying to maximize profit and opportunity, and often overly using leverage. The Three Red Lines curbed the excesses, and led to a huge implosion in the properties development sector.
But can we imagine if that "ill-timed" curbing was not performed? The bubble would have been even bigger. If it was to implode on its own weight, it would be much, much worse. So I would say the curbing was not ill-timed; and in fact, it could have been done even earlier. But whenever it is done, it will always receive complaints. No participant will priase it, ever. We should be glad that the bubble was only huge, but not mega huge, like the 2008 bubble in the US.
In fact, China is not like 2008 US. The leverage with the homeowners is much, much lower. There is no risk of implosion there. Nor is there any chance of implosion in the main financial institutions; whereas, if we remember, almost all the major US financial institutions were going bankrupt in the US, except for a massive irresponsible printing of money, and the pre-destruction of a good future for future generations.
A government that does not curb a bubble is irresponsible, or stupid, or both. That we can see abundantly clear in the US. As the most advanced country with probably the most number of Economics Nobel prizes, it is a wonder how poorly, and irresponsibly the country was governed.
So I would say, the curbing was not "ill-timed" at all. It was excellent that it was done by a courageous government who cared about the future and responsibility. But it takes careful understanding to appreciate it.
I have a question: You are talking about "ultra leftists." Are you talking about a true movement, similar to that which fired Hu Yao Bang or, worse, that fueled the cultural revolution? Are there genuine ultra leftists in the provinces, at the grassroots or in the political and administrative apparatus at the level of provincial governments or even lower, prefectures or counties? To outside observers, the leftist "reform" movement appears to be, in typical autocratic stye, Xi Jinping's own idea, made possible by his cronies. The leftist drift appears to be more of a old school Communist, top down campaign, than a genuine bottom up movement.