My latest column: China's anti-graft drive may have yielded solid success but its total reliance on "family code" has its limits. Time to highlight the roles of lawyers and media.

This is the English translation of my latest column published today in Ming Pao, a leading Chinese-language newspaper in Hong Kong, ably assisted by ChatGPT. Happy Chinese New Year!

Ming Pao Column
28/01/2025
Wang Xiangwei

Reflecting on the past decade, if you were to ask Chinese citizens what has left the most profound impression on them regarding national governance, most would undoubtedly answer: the anti-corruption campaign.

Since Xi Jinping took office at the end of 2012, he has, in his own words, launched an “unprecedented anti-corruption campaign with the determination to use strong medicine to cure the illness, with the courage to scrape poison off one’s own bone and cut one’s own wrist (to save the body), firmly opposing corruption wherever it appears and punishing it.”

This ongoing anti-corruption storm has not only established Xi as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong but also fundamentally transformed the philosophy, methods, and approaches of Chinese governance.

Just weeks after taking office, Xi launched the first wave of the anti-corruption campaign by investigating Li Chuncheng, the then-recently elected alternate member of the 18th Central Committee and deputy party secretary of Sichuan. Since then, nearly every month, high-ranking officials from both the party and government, so-called provincial and ministerial-level officials, have fallen from power. In late July 2014, Zhou Yongkang, former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, was put under investigation, becoming the highest-ranking official to be imprisoned for corruption in decades.

As the anti-corruption campaign deepened, it exposed astonishing levels of corruption within the Communist Party. In Xi Jinping’s own words, “The greed of some corrupt officials, the enormous amounts involved, the long duration, and the egregious nature of their actions are shocking. In some places, there has even been systemic corruption.”

The most notable example is Lai Xiaomin, former chairman of China Huarong Asset Management Co., who took bribes amounting to nearly 1.8 billion yuan. His case became the first since the start of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign to result in a death sentence for corruption and bribery.

The so-called "systemic corruption" refers to cases where the investigation of one or a few officials in a region or department implicates dozens or even hundreds of other officials. In 2014, over 300 provincial and municipal officials in Shanxi, a major coal-producing province, were investigated, dismissed, or imprisoned in a case of systemic corruption.

According to official statistics, since the end of 2012, more than 6.2 million party members have been disciplined, including 675 provincial and ministerial-level officials. In 2024 alone, 890,000 party members were disciplined, an increase of nearly 46% compared to 2023. Additionally, 73 provincial and ministerial-level officials were investigated in 2024, significantly higher than the 49 investigated in 2023.

At the fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection held in early January this year, Xi emphasized that corruption is the greatest threat to the Party, and combating corruption represents the most thorough kind of self-reform. Xi noted that the current anti-corruption situation remains grave and complex. The backlog of corruption has not yet been eradicated, and new cases continue to arise. The task of eliminating the breeding grounds and conditions for corruption remains arduous.

He emphasized that the anti-corruption struggle must be unwavering. Any hesitation, laxity or abandonment will lead to catastrophic mistakes. He stressed the need to resolutely dispel all misconceptions, clear away ideological confusion, and further strengthen determination and confidence in the fight against corruption.

His remarks seem to respond to both domestic and international skepticism about the anti-corruption campaign. In fact, mainland official media often mention different voices from home and abroad in their commentaries on the anti-corruption campaign. For example, some question whether the Communist Party’s anti-corruption efforts are a “House of Cards,” while others claim the corruption has worsened despite the campaign. There are also arguments that the campaign has made officials hesitant and inactive, adversely affecting economic development.

Of course, the official media commentaries have tried hard to criticize those, citing Xi Jinping’s words, “I believe the sky will not fall”. But the fact remains the unprecedented anti-corruption efforts over the past twelve years have not eradicated existing corruption, and new cases continue to emerge. The Communist Party’s firm stance on anti-corruption is commendable and has won public approval. However, while intensifying the anti-corruption campaign, the Party leadership should also consider further improving anti-corruption systems and methods, enhancing media and social supervision. More importantly, finding more effective ways to prevent the abuse and uncontrolled exercise of power in a relatively open and transparent environment is crucial.

Putting power in a cage or containing power within institutional constraints is a key issue the Communist Party must address in its anti-corruption efforts. Xi Jinping has said that putting power in a cage means legally defining, regulating, restraining, and supervising power, once quoting Lord Acton’s famous dictum: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

To this end, the Communist Party has introduced a series of regulations to strictly manage and supervise cadres, including the system for reporting personal matters, restrictions on the business activities of leaders' spouses and children, and mechanisms for supervising the selection and appointment of officials, focusing on the so-called “First Hand” officials, namely, party secretaries at various levels and departments. As of the end of 2022, anti-corruption agencies had investigated 207,000 “First Hand” officials.

Despite tighter “cage” constraints, systemic corruption and cases involving “First Hand” officials continue to emerge. Last year alone, 58 vice-ministerial level and above officials were investigated, including nine full ministerial-ranking, more than half of whom were investigated while in office. This includes former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian and former Minister of Justice Tang Yijun, who were arrested.

In November 2024, General Miao Hua, member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Political Work Department, was suspended for investigation due to serious violations. Throughout 2024, dozens of senior and former senior officials in the aviation and defense industries were investigated, indicating that systemic corruption persists.

Currently, the Communist Party’s anti-corruption efforts rely entirely on party regulations and methods, even suggesting that party discipline should be stricter than national law. While this sounds impressive, it inevitably raises concerns about the effectiveness of self-investigation and the possibility of party discipline overriding national law.

The Communist Party leadership should consider enhancing media and social supervision. For example, the excessive and concentrated power of “First Hand ” officials at various levels and the lack of transparency in the decision-making process mean that even with strict discipline, these officials have significant discretionary power. Although major investment projects require so-called collective discussion and approval by the party committee, other members are subordinate to the “First Hand” official, making it difficult to provide effective checks and balances. Thus, these leading officials can easily push through multi-million or even multi-billion yuan investments or loans according to their own wishes.

In fact, social forces can be used to counterbalance such power. The Communist Party can learn from other countries' experiences and establish appropriation committees composed of NPC deputies, scholars, and professionals. Investments and loans above a certain scale would require the committee’s approval, significantly reducing rent-seeking opportunities and minimizing redundant or low-return projects driven by local or departmental interests.

Furthermore, media should be allowed greater supervisory authority. Domestic and international experience shows that media supervision plays a crucial role in promoting fairness and justice, making decision-making more transparent and predictable.

More importantly, the anti-corruption campaign should emphasize the rule of law to avoid the frequent occurrence of “long range fishing” at the local level. This term refers to the practice of some local law enforcement agencies conducting cross-province or cross-region operations for profit-driven enforcement, essentially “money-making” operations. Last year, illegal cross-region arrests of private entrepreneurs, asset seizures, and property transfers by public security departments were common, causing panic and dissatisfaction. In fact, this problem can be easily solved by requiring that when law enforcement agencies detain individuals for any reason, the individual's lawyer must be present.

This approach should also apply to the widely criticized border control mechanism known as exit bans. Like many countries, China has a blacklist system in its border control to prevent Chinese citizens or foreign nationals involved in economic cases from leaving the country. However, the lack of transparency and an appeal mechanism regarding this system, including what behaviors result in being blacklisted and when the control can be lifted, has caused widespread concern. In recent years, many overseas businessmen and investors, mostly from Hong Kong or foreign nationals residing in Hong Kong, have been subjected to exit bans, sometimes preventing them from leaving the country for years. The most unsettling aspect is that some Hong Kong residents subjected to exit bans were not informed of the reasons nor contacted by law enforcement, leaving them in a state of confusion and anxiety, which contradicts China’s open policy. The solution is simple: establish an appeal mechanism allowing individuals to understand the case through their lawyers and appeal, while preventing abuse of power by some officials.

Officials under investigation for corruption should also have access to lawyers. Currently, China’s anti-corruption departments can use party regulations, colloquially known as “family code,” to detain suspects indefinitely without allowing them any contact, including with family and lawyers, until they are handed over to the prosecution.

In fact, emphasizing the rule of law and the role of lawyers from the beginning of the investigation can better reflect fairness and justice.

End.